






With the penetrating vision of hindsight, it
is apparent that both buyers and sellers of nat-
ural gas made fundamental mistakes in negoti-
ating gas contracts during the 1970s. Producers
and pipelines overestimated future demand,
with the result that they entered into long-term
contracts at unrealistically high prices and with
huge take-or-pay obligations. The result of these
errors has been that thousands of producers have
not received payments that they counted on to
continue their businesses, and the financial well-
being of several large pipelines has been thrown
into jeopardy.
Bitter experience with gas contracts of the
1970s has taught those associated with the nat-
ural gas industry lessons that are reflected in a
new breed of contract. Sensitivity to market
conditions is the watchword for the hard times
of the 1980s.
Both buyers and sellers grossly misjudged
what the demand for natural gas would be in
the 1980s as they negotiated in the 1970s. While
supply remained relatively stable, the demand
for natural gas shrunk approximately 21 per-
cent between 1979 and 1986, from 20.2 tril-
lion cubic feet to 16.0 trillion cubic feet. The
following statistics, from the 1987-88 edition
of Natural Gas Trends, published by Arthur
Anderson & Co. and Cambridge Energy Re-
search Associates, summarize-the decline:
Natural Gas Consumption in
Trillions of Cubic Feet
Residen. Commer- Electric
Year tial cial Industrial Utilities Other
1979 .... 5.0 2.8 6.8 3.2 2.2
1986 .... 4.4 2.3 5.2 2.6 1.6
Current estimates of the surplus of natural gas
range between two and four trillion cubic feet.
What happened? How did the United States
move so quickly from an economy that seemed
unable to get enough natural gas to one with
such a large surplus? The answer appears to lie
in a combination of economic and regulatory
effects that have interacted somewhat differ-
ently upon different segments of the economy.
Conservation was an important factor. Nat-
ural gas demand for residential and commercial
purposes declined 12 percent and 18 percent,
respectively, from 1979 to 1986 as a result of
lower thermostat settings and increased effi-
ciency of furnaces, air conditioners, and appli-
ances. Millions of home owners and business
people insulated their attics, installed storm
windows, caulked the seams of their buildings,
and replaced energy inefficient appliances with
equipment that worked better on less natural
gas or electricity.
Structural change and fuel switching were
also important in the decline of demand for nat-
ural gas, particularly in the industrial and elec-
trical utility sectors. The use of natural gas in
industry and for the generation of electricity,
which together still account for nearly half of
the total demand, dropped approximately 19
percent from 1979 to 1986. Increased effi-
ciency of equipment played a role in the de-
cline, but more important was the profound
structural change in U.S. industry away from
energy intensive uses of natural gas during the
period. For example, U.S. steel production de-
clined 40 percent during the years in question.
To some degree, high-tech industries replaced
steel in our economy, and making computer
chips consumes much less natural gas than mak-
ing steel girders.
Fuel switching, from gas to oil and coal,
was a second factor causing a decline in indus-
trial and electric generating demand for natural
gas. The gas shortage of the 1970s led busi-
nesses constructing new industrial plants and
utility generating plants to install fuel switching
capacity so that they could keep their doors
open even if they could not get natural gas.
When the prices of oil and coal began to slide,
fuel switching capacity was used to lower op-
erating costs. The decline in the use of gas was
accelerated by the Power Plant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act of 1978, which prohibited the
construction of new electrical generating plants
that burned natural gas. Though we now have
a gas surplus and the Fuel Use Act was repealed
in 1987, we have a whole generation of electric
facilities that cannot burn gas, and twenty years
of industrial plants that can rapidly switch from
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gas to coal to oil and back again, some literally
on a daily basis. Natural Gas Trends estimates
that nearly 40 percent of end-use consumption
presently occurs in facilities with some alter-
native fuel capacity and that at least a third of
the combined industrial and electrical genera-
tion markets can switch at virtually no cost
within a few days.
The interaction of conservation, structural
change, and fuel switching was exacerbated by
rising prices to natural gas consumers. While
oil prices peaked in 1981, natural gas prices at
the burner tip continued to increase until 1984,
rising 28 percent in the three-year period be-
fore turning modestly downward for residential
users and sharply downward for industrial and
electrical users. As will be discussed below, gas
contract provisions were partly responsible for
the rise of prices in the face of a decline in
demand. So too was the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978 (NGPA), which provided for incentive
pricing.
In the early 1970s, policy makers were con-
vinced that this country would never again have
enough natural gas. A variety of policies to en-
courage conservation and promote new produc-
tion were implemented, chief of which was the
NGPA. The NGPA was based upon the premise
that natural gas prices should be deregulated,
but it sought to protect the U.S. economy against
"price shock" by postponing deregulation until
1985 and extending federal regulation to the
intrastate market. The scheme of the NGPA was
to regulate prices at ever higher levels until the
gap between the regulated price and the free
market price was small, at which time deregu-
lation would begin. NGPA worked-it stabilized
supply and provided a structured escalation of
regulated prices-but it actually accelerated the
decline in natural gas demand. Many of NGPA's
"maximum lawful prices," which were trans-
lated into actual prices paid by the gas contracts
of the 1970s, exceeded the free market price
well before 1985.
When oil prices plunged in early 1986,
however, the NGPA deregulation process had
already begun, and prices on the growing spot
market dropped like a rock. According to Nat-
ural Gas Trends, the spot price for gas deliv-
ered to major pipelines from the Texas offshore
producing area fell from $2.18 per mcf in Jan-
uary 1986 to $1.41 per mcf in November 1986.
Prices have recovered somewhat since then, but
they remain sensitive to the prices of competing
fuels.
In the late 1980s, natural gas has become
just another fuel which must compete with coal
and oil-and perhaps garbage and surplus
corn-for market share. Natural gas must now
compete in a free market.
Contracts of the Seventies
As many producers and pipelines negoti-
ated gas contracts in the 1970s, they did not
anticipate the decline in natural gas demand of
the 1980s. In fact, their contracts exacerbated
the decline in demand. Three contract provi-
sions lay at the heart of the problem-the term,
quantity, and price escalator clauses. These pro-
visions contributed to the inflexibility of the
market for natural gas, which in turn acceler-
ated the decline in demand.
Gas contracts of the 1970s were for long
terms. Twenty-five-year or "life-of-the-well"
agreements were common, as they had been
since the interstate pipelines were built. In part,
long terms reflected regulatory requirements.
The Natural Gas Act of 1938 required that gas
dedicated to interstate commerce be subject to
a minimum fifteen-year contract. Economic
considerations also demanded long terms. Long-
term commitments were a condition of the
complex financing arrangements entered into
for the construction of many of the interstate
pipelines. Even after the construction loans were
paid, the maintenance and operation of pipe-
lines generated high fixed costs, so that pipe-
line gas buyers placed long contract terms as a
high priority in negotiations.
When the demand for natural gas declined
sharply in the 1980s, long contract terms ex-
acerbated the disputes between producers and
pipelines. However bad a deal may be, it is eas-
ier to tolerate it for a short term than for many
years.
How much of a commodity will be taken
at a given price is as important as the price itself
in determining profitability. Gas wells will not
always deliver when gas is desired, however,
and purchasers' needs vary with the season and
the state of the economy. Therefore, gas con-
tracts of the 1970s typically contained lengthy
and complicated provisions addressing the
quantity of gas that the seller was obligated to
provide and the amounts that the buyer had to
take.
The most important of the quantity provi-
sions usually seen in 1970s gas contracts was
the take-or-pay clause. A take-or-pay clause ob-
ligates a purchaser to pay for a percentage of
the gas which the producer can produce,
whether or not the purchaser actually takes it.
Take-or-pay clauses usually permit the pur-
chaser to make up gas paid for but not taken.











anteed minimum cash flow in return for dedi-
cating the gas supply to the purchaser.
In the 1970s, pipelines often used favor-
able take-or-pay terms as an incentive to induce
producers to sell to them. Price regulation un-
der the Natural Gas Act and the NGPA effec-
tively barred price competition by purchasers,
so pipelines competed by offering attractive
nonprice terms. Producers saw the clauses as
risk-shifting devices that would protect them
against demand fluctuations. Take-or-pay per-
centages increased from as low as 35 percent
in the early 1970s to 90 percent at the height
of the boom.
When gas demand declined sharply, many
pipelines found themselves confronted with
huge liabilities. Estimates vary widely, but total
potential liability of U.S. pipelines was proba-
bly in the range of $15-30 billion over the life
of their contracts. Several major pipelines con-
fronted contingent liabilities several times the
value of their assets.
Producers faced serious difficulties also, for
they had never dreamed that pipelines would
neither take nor pay. However, that is exactly
what happened. The Natural Gas Supply Asso-
ciation estimated in 1987 that only 2.6 percent
of the outstanding take-or-pay obligations for
1984-85 had been paid.
In the mid- 1980s, the take-or-pay problem
was exacerbated in the short run by the efforts
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) to deregulate the natural gas industry.
In 1984, FERC Order 380 permitted the cus-
tomers of interstate pipelines to escape the bur-
dens of variable-cost minimum bill provisions.
Minimum bill provisions were similar to take-
or-pay clauses in that customers were required
to pay for minimum quantities of gas whether
or not they actually took the gas. In 1985, FERC
Order 436 provided a combination of carrots
and sticks to encourage pipelines to elect to
become open access transporters of natural gas.
One result of FERC's efforts was the creation of
a burgeoning spot market for natural gas in
which pipelines function as transporters rather
than as merchants. According to Natural Gas
Trends, major pipeline companies sold only 7
tcf of the 16.2 tcf of natural gas used in 1986.
Another result was that take-or-pay liabilities of
pipelines soared as consumers turned to the spot
market for cheaper gas.
Litigation over take-or-pay clauses boomed
in the mid-1980s. Producers brought billions
of dollars of claims for take-or-pay payments
against their pipeline purchasers. Facing finan-
cial ruin, the pipelines resisted fiercely, raising
a variety of affirmative defenses.
Force majeure and commercial impracti-
cability are the most important defenses against
take-or-pay claims, but they have been effective
only infrequently. The force majeure defense
is based upon contractual provisions that define
when the parties are to be relieved of their ob-
ligations. It has rarely succeeded because the
language of the force majeure clause in gas con-
tracts does not ordinarily define market failure
as a force majeure event. Moreover, the courts
have been reticent to find that a few words in
a "boilerplate" clause are intended to override
the lengthy and detailed take-or-pay provisions.
The commercial impracticability defense has its
roots in the common law and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Performance is excused if made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contin-
gency that the parties had assumed would not
occur. Thus far, the courts have generally re-
jected the notion that failure of the gas market
is a basis for commercial impracticability; there
have been market disruptions for as long as there
has been a gas industry. A better argument for
the pipelines, which has not yet been fully
tested, is that FERC's restructuring of the gas
industry by Order 380 and Order 436 is a basis
for a defense of commercial impracticability.
The strength of this argument, however, turns
on when the contract was executed; it should
have been apparent well before Order 380 was
proposed that the market was not functioning.pipelines and producers have settled





prodding from the courts, FERC has
tried to ease the pipelines' predica-
ment with Order 500, requiring producers who
wish to transport gas to offer the transporting
pipelines volume-for-volume credits against
take-or-pay liabilities. Still, billions of dollars of
claims are before the courts, and many produc-
ers (or their bankruptcy trustees) may decide
that continuing litigation over long-term, high-
priced, high-percentage take-or-pay contracts is
more profitable than producing and selling gas.
The legacy of the contracts of the 1970s con-
tinues to trouble the natural gas industry.
In addition to long terms and minimum take
requirements, 1970's contracts included price
adjustment terms which exacerbated the pur-
chasers' burdens. The long-term contracts of the
1970s contained price adjustment provisions
because the parties could foresee that the initial
price agreed upon when the contract was formed
would not be likely to be fair over the long run.
Price adjustment provisions in gas contracts of








what went up would never come down and that
a fair price for natural gas would always be
higher in the future than in the past. A variety
of escalator clauses were included, often with
the proviso that the clause that yielded the high-
est legal price would apply. As a result, contract
prices climbed steadily higher, increasing the
burden of take-or-pay obligations.
Gas contracts of the 1970s often included
definite price adjustment clauses, provisions that
called for periodic fixed or percentage price
escalations. Definite price adjustment provi-
sions invariably ratcheted the contract price
higher. I have never seen a definite price ad-
justment clause that provided for a downward
adjustment.
Contracts of the 1970s also usually con-
tained a variety of indefinite price escalator
clauses, by which the price was redetermined
by reference to factors outside the contract it-
self. Two such clauses, the "area rate" clause
and "the most favored nations" clause were par-
ticularly troublesome, for they worked together
to push contract prices upward in a stair step
fashion, while demand slid down the bannister.
Area rate clauses were common to contracts
covering gas that was subject to federal price
regulation at the time the contract was exe-
cuted. An area rate clause provides for periodic
price increases to the highest price permitted
by the appropriate regulatory body for gas being
sold in the area. After passage of the NGPA, FERC
held that area rate clauses might be triggered
by maximum lawful prices established under
the NGPA. As a result, the price of large quan-
tities of "old" gas escalated sharply and then
adjusted upward each month.
The favored nations clause tied the contract
price to prices being paid in the area for gas of
comparable quantity and quality at the time of
sale. Once the incentive prices approved by the
NGPA began to be paid, however, area rate
clauses operated to increase the price for "old"
categories of natural gas to the maximum prices
permitted by NGPA. The favored nations clause
in one contract was often triggered by the area
rate clause in another. Thus, each monthly in-
crease in the maximum lawful price permitted
by the NGPA set off a new round of contract
price increases.
Other indefinite price adjustment provi-
sions in gas contracts of the 1970s that might
have made contract prices responsive to de-
mand were drafted so that they did not apply.
Parties to 1970s-era gas contracts who antici-
pated that the federal government would even-
tually cease regulating gas prices at the wellhead
often included a "price renegotiation" clause
to set out the procedures for negotiation in a
free market. Most 1970s renegotiation provi-
sions worked only one way, however, permit-
ting renegotiation only at the demand of the
producer. Furthermore, they applied only after
price deregulation. The decline in demand pre-
dated official price deregulation in 1985, and
the pipelines wanted to renegotiate, not the
producers. Thus, price renegotiation clauses
were ineffective in counteracting price in-
creases mandated by area rate and favored na-
tions clauses.
The "price index" clause was a second type
of indefinite price escalator provision often seen
in 1970s gas contracts that might have made
contract prices responsive to market demand,
but did not. A price index clause sets price by
reference to changes in the indices of prices for
other fuels, particularly those that compete with
natural gas. Price index clauses in gas contracts
of the 1970s included oil reference clauses
(which keyed prices to the price of fuel oil in
the primary market area of the purchaser), im-
ported gas reference clauses (which adjusted
the price by reference to changes in the price
of gas imported from Canada or Mexico), and
electric reference clauses (which provided for
changes in natural gas prices by reference to
changes in the price of electricity). In most
1970s contracts, however, price index clauses,
like renegotiation clauses, were triggered only
at the option of the seller, and the seller was
entitled to the highest price determined by any
variation of the clause or by any other price
escalator clause. Thus, price index clauses had
little effect upon the inexorable increases of gas
prices.
The combination of high take-or-pay per-
centages, escalating prices, and collapsing mar-
ket demand for natural gas would have been
even more devastating for the industry had it
not been for the "market-out" clause. A market-
out clause, or an economic-out clause, as it is
frequently termed, permits a natural gas pur-
chaser to demand lower prices or to cancel the
contract when the price set by the price esca-
lation provisions is too high. Market-out clauses
appeared frequently in contracts by 1980. They
reflected the concern of some purchasers that
the price surge that began in the mid-1970s
would ultimately make natural gas uncompeti-
tive with other fuels.
A market-out clause generally permits the
gas purchaser to lower the price at the wellhead
when gas purchased at that price cannot be sold
profitably in the purchaser's primary market.
Early versions of the market-out clause were ob-















tion of the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA)
affect public participation in management of
federal public lands. She argues public inter-
vention rights should be granted broadly at the
initial stages of administrative BLM proceed-
ings, but that public intervention in or right of
appeal to the IBLA should be restricted based
on the person's ability to enhance the decision-
making process. This interest representation
model would closely reflect the broad jurisdic-




Abraham, "Environmental Liability and the
Limits of Insurance," 88 Columbia Law Re-
view 942 (1988). The author reviews the im-
pact of environmental liability on the liability
insurance market. The causes of the liability in-
surance crisis of the mid-1980s are examined.
The author posits that, whereas in most fields
of tort law liability insurance has followed de-
veloping law, the environmental law area has
not evidenced the same willingness of insur-
ance providers to cover the risk. This may be
due to special considerations present in the en-
vironmental liability field, which the author
contends courts and legislators should take into
account.
Lessons of the Seven
jective, providing for price adjustment by ref-
erence to competing fuels:
If at any time Buyer's average rolled-in gas cost
at - , including all transportation and al-
locable costs, exceeds the BTU equivalent cost
of the lowest priced #2 fuel oil, as officially
posted the first business day of each month by
Platts Oilgram for the - area, Buyer shall
have the right to redetermine the price for gas
purchased and sold hereunder.
Later versions of the market-out clause gave the
buyer broad discretion to determine when price
adjustment was necessary. For example:
Notwithstanding any other provisions in this
agreement, the price to be paid for any gas de-
livered or for which payment is due hereunder
including taxes, shall never exceed ... a price
which will prevent buyer's resale of gas from
its pipeline system to its customers. Buyer, in
its sole opinion, will determine whether the
purchase of gas under the pricing provisions
hereof will result in gas prices which buyer's
customers will not be willing to pay.
Glass, "Superfund and SARA: Are There Any
Defenses Left?" 12 Harvard Environmental
Law Review 385 (1988). The author reviews
the liability imposed on private parties by the
Superfund law. She contends that the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) has zealously
and systematically sought expansion of Super-
fund liability on all fronts, which the courts
have granted almost completely. She argues that
EPA's motivation has been to establish a "deep
pocket" assessment of liability, and she at-
tempts to demonstrate this through a detailed,
up-to-date discussion of virtually every defense
that has ever been raised to Superfund liability.
She concludes that recent developments, such
as the 1986 amendments to the Act, may indi-
cate an era of fault-related imposition of liabil-
ity.
James, "Financial Institutions and Hazard-
ous Waste Litigation: Limiting the Exposure to
Superfund Liability," 28 Natural Resources
Journal 329 (1988). The author focuses his
discussion on the Superfund liability that falls
upon financial institutions which foreclose upon
security interests in active disposal facilities or
become the innocent subsequent owners of
abandoned hazardous waste sites. He recom-
mends a course of action for financial institu-
tions to take to minimize the risk of uninten-
tionally assuming such liabilities, including
indemnifications, environmental risk assess-
ments, and environmental audits.
ities Continued from page 6
Pipelines that had market-out clauses in
their contracts could force contract prices
downward so as to compete for market share.
Without such clauses, both the decline in
demand and the take-or-pay carnage among
pipelines would have been worse. Of course,
producers whose contracts contained these
strange provisions-which were not exercised
until 1982-are less sanguine about their effect.
A New Generation of
Gas Contracts
The hard times of the natural gas industry
in the 1980s and the changes in its structure
are reflected in a new generation of gas con-
tracts. As the industry moves into the 1990s,
the watchwords of contract drafters are flexi-
bility and market responsiveness.
One apparent difference between gas con-
tracts of the 1970s and the new generation of46
gas contracts is the identity of the purchaser.
Contracts of the 1970s were almost always
between producers and pipelines. Pipelines
bought gas from producers and then sold it to
local distribution companies, which in turn
supplied end users-residences, businesses, in-
dustrial plants, and electrical generators. As a
result of FERC Order 436, however, most pipe-
lines now transport gas as well as buy it for
resale. This development means that producers
may sell to gatherers, to brokers, to local dis-
tribution companies, or to end users, as well as
to pipelines. The diverse interests of the new
players in the market mean that there is sub-
stantially more variety in 1980s contract terms
than in those of the 1970s.
The new generation of gas contracts differs
substantially from gas contracts of the 1970s in
their provisions for term, quantity, and price.
Most current gas contracts are for short terms,
ranging from a few days to a year. The philos-
ophy appears to be "let's go along as long as
we get along," and the short terms are often
coupled with "evergreen" provisions that ex-
tend the contract after its initial term until one
of the parties gives notice, usually of only a few
days or weeks, of termination.
Take-or-pay provisions are rarely found in
contracts in mid-1988. A few pipelines still
agree to take or pay for modest percentages of
well delivery capacity-perhaps 15-20 per-
cent-but even they combine the take-or-pay
clause with flexible pricing terms. Short-term
contracts may in fact impose no quantity obli-
gation upon buyers. The longer term contracts
are likely to replace the take-or-pay provision
with a "take or release" clause, which gives the
seller the right to terminate the contract if the
buyer does not take minimum amounts of pro-
duction.
It is the pricing provisions of the new gen-
eration contracts, however, that differ most
sharply from the gas contracts of the 1970s.
New contracts may contain a variety of provi-
sions, including some modeled upon price es-
calator clauses of the 1970s, but new price
adjustment provisions are much more flexible
and responsive to market demand than their
predecessors of the 1970s.
Perhaps the favorite clause of those pur-
chasing gas for resale-pipelines or gas bro-
kers-is the "net-back" clause. A net-back
clause sets the price to be paid to the producer
by "netting back" the price received from the
ultimate sale, less transportation charges and
costs incurred. The purpose of the net-back
clause is to permit natural gas to compete ag-
gressively with alternative fuels in the pur-
chaser's market area. Under this clause, gas is
sold for whatever the market will bear, and the
producer's price is calculated back. An example
of a net-back clause follows:
Buyer shall pay seller . . . a price per MMBTU,
inclusive of all taxes and other additives, equal
to the weighted average sales price for that
month multiplied by seller's contract percent-
age, less the sum of (1) all fees and charges
incurred by buyer or its agent to have the gas
purchased hereunder transported . . . and (2)
all fees and charges, if any, that buyer charges
seller to dehydrate, compress, treat, meter, con-
dition, or gather the gas. ...
Net-back clauses have caused producers to
become more involved in regulatory rate-mak-
ing proceedings because what the producer gets
is affected directly by the rates of the trans-
porters. As the cost of transportation increases,
the amount received by the producer declines.
In addition, they raise difficult interpretative
problems that are yet to be litigated, e.g., what
"fees and charges" are "incurred" in transpor-
tation.
Another price adjustment clause that per-
mits strong competition between natural gas and
competing fuels is the "meet or release" clause.
A meet or release clause gives the buyer some
assurance that the gas it purchases will be com-
petitive by letting the buyer either force down
the price it pays to the seller or buy from a new
source. Often, meet or release clauses are mod-
eled on market-out clauses:
If . . . the price payable hereunder becomes
uneconomical for Buyer, or the transportation
fees for gas purchased hereunder are increased
or become uneconomical for Buyer, or the price
of any equivalent fuel becomes competitive with
the price of gas hereunder, Buyer will have the
right to nominate . . . a new price .... Seller
will have the option to sell Buyer gas at the new
price.... In the event that Seller does not ac-
cept such lower price within days af-
ter receipt of Buyer's new price nomination,
then Buyer, upon days written notice
to Seller, may terminate this contract.
In other words, the producer must either meet
the competition or release the buyer frdm the
contract. Meet or release clauses may be drafted
to give the producer the right to demand a high-
er price, too. Unless they work both ways-for
the producer as well as the buyer-meet or re-
lease clauses are not likely to be a satisfactory
pricing device in the long run.
Other price adjustment provisions fre-
quently seen in the mid- 1980s are variations of
the price escalator clauses found in gas con-
tracts of the 1970s. Renegotiation clauses are











for sales to end users. In contrast with their sensitive than the old. In my opinion, however,
predecessors, however, new generation rene- new generation contracts are no more litigation
gotiation clauses permit either the buyer or the proof than contracts of the 1970s.
seller to demand price renegotiation at frequent Natural gas is a commodity, and the stakes
intervals-monthly or quarterly. Price index are always high in the commodities markets.
clauses are also used, primarily to keep gas com- Inevitably, there will be winners and losers. The
petitive with residual fuel oils. Some look very stakes of the game are lowered by short-term
much like the objective market-out provision contracts and by contracts that can be quickly
quoted above and require comparison of gas renegotiated. When large quantities are in-
and fuel oil prices in the burner-tip market. volved, however-and spot market gas sales
Others key the contract price of gas to a per- often involve huge quantities in a single trans-
centage-e.g., 60 percent of the no. 2 fuel oil action-the stakes are greatly increased. In ad-
price-in the producing area. dition, many economists are predicting that
As the title of this article indicates, business industrial and electric generating customers are
people in the natural gas industry and the at- likely to move back to longer term contracts as
torneys who represent them have learned from the gas surplus dissipates. Under either scenar-
the mistakes they made in gas contracts nego- io, the game of gas contract negotiating, draft-
tiated and drafted in the 1970s. The new gen- ing, and litigation is likely to continue at a brisk
eration of gas contracts is much more market pace.
The Pipeline Perspective Continued from page 10
Resolving take-or-pay liability is a high take-or-pay liability. Although FERC cannot re-
priority during settlement negotiations. Take- vise take-or-pay contracts, it can condition the
or-pay must be addressed in two respects: ac- producer's access to the pipeline. Order 500 af-
crued liability must be resolved and the pro- firms the open access provisions of Order 436
spective obligation reduced. The preceding and provides a crediting mechanism for gas
paragraphs have covered several means of transported. The order provides that if the pipe-
avoiding take-or-pay obligations prospectively, line transports gas for the producer, the produc-
primarily by reducing the purchase obligation er must give the pipelines a volume-for-volume
and bringing it in line with market demand. credit toward take-or-pay liability accruing after
Take-or-pay liability is more important than January 1, 1986, on any contract between the
ever before, since FERC Order 380 has stripped same parties, at the pipeline's election. When
away some of the protection pipelines had the producer's alternative is to give up part of
against take-or-pay provisions. Historically, its take-or-pay claim or have no access to the
minimum bills served as a strong disincentive market, settlement is a more attractive option.
for pipeline customers to buy from other Another facet of the take-or-pay problem is
sources; if a customer failed to purchase its con- whether any outright payment to the producer
tractual minimum amount, it had to pay for it for accrued take-or-pay liability must be passed
anyway. The customer's failure to purchase may through to royalty owners. The Fifth Circuit
have caused the pipeline to be unable to pur- Court of Appeals in Mesa Petroleum Company,
chase from the producer, resulting in potential Cities Service Oil & Gas Company and Dia-
take-or-pay liability. However, once the cus- mond Shamrock Exploration Company v.
tomer had made its minimum bill payment, the Donald P. Hodel and United States Depart-
pipeline had a pool of funds from which to ment of Interior, consolidated under Nos. 87-
draw in making the take-or-pay payment. After 3195, 87-4069, and 87-3207, decided in Au-
Order 380, this protection is gone. gust 1988, that for Outer Continental Shelf
Consequently, most pipelines make waiver Leasing Act (OCSLA) leases, at least, royalty need
of accrued take-or-pay liability a condition to not be paid on take-or-pay payments. The pro-
contract renegotiation. Waiver of take-or-pay ducer's posture on the issue may influence his
claims may also be a condition to joining a pipe- bargaining position. If he plans to keep the pay-
line's least-cost plan or special marketing pro- ment, he is less likely to exchange accraed take-
gram, although, at least in Texas, such a con- or-pay liability in the bargaining process. If the
dition is specifically prohibited by state regu- payment is to be passed through, he may be
lations. willing to trade it away.
FERC Order 500 has also had an impact on Obviously, a pipeline will want to elimi-
